Law functions on the basis of some presuppositions of what a person is. The purposes and tasks that are projected on a legal system depend on an understanding of personhood. Also, courts continuously find themselves in situations where they have to define the person or the legal subject, at times with surprising consequences. However, legal theory lacks clear criteria for personhood. We do not know who or what a legal person is, nor do we know what kind of being we want her to be. There is clearly a need for critical examination of the concept of legal personhood. This article takes its inspiration from a historical theory, which sheds light on the complex logics of subjectivity. Reflecting on the thought of Johann Gottlieb Fichte we can contemplate fundamental aspects of personhood, especially in its politico-legal dimensions. It is claimed in this article that even though the legal subject has to be autonomous to some degree, acknowledging otherness inside the self is a compelling way of understanding legal personhood.
growing importance. These developments indicate that at least in Europe, the human being is sneaking its way to the centre stage of law. 3 There is a fundamental shift of emphasis taking place in Europe: where the Union was primarily concerned with trade and free movement, it is now more and more explicitly attentive to the human beings who are its subjects (as both actors and subservients). In the midst of this ongoing development it is worthwhile to take a step back and consider the philosophical underpinnings of the legal human being. The value of this analysis is that it can illustrate how we understand persons in law and perhaps also the limits of what a person can be, according to legal thinking.
The conceptual linking between legal order and the human being understood as an autonomous agent are numerous. Lon L. Fuller's view is well known:
"To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults. Every departure from the principles of the law's inner morality is an affront to man's dignity as a responsible agent." [13, p. 162].
Other similar ideas on human autonomy are common in jurisprudence. We find for instance in Neil MacCormick's work a clear interdependence between law and the autonomous individual. He says that " […] only an autonomous being can respond through acts of volition to the requirements of normative order. For in the last resort only an autonomous being can respond through acts of volition to the requirements of normative order." [21, p. 128] . It makes sense; law, in order to work, must assume that human beings are actors with at least some will of their own, thus autonomous. Of course the connection between normative order and individual autonomy is far from simple. The choices that people make will be responses to the normative order. But the person making the choices will be influenced by that very same order. MacCormick goes so far as to argue that "[i]n the development of moral agency, heteronomy precedes autonomy" [21, p. 128] . Thus there can be no completely independent, free or autonomous subject. 4 MacCormick here alludes to a problematic idea that will be discussed below in detail: in order for us to be autonomous selves, we are already permeated by otherness. How should we understand a subject, who is conditioned by the normative order but nevertheless autonomous? This problem is analysed below.
This article is guided by an awareness of the fact that there are problems with our present understanding of legal subjectivity. 5 We lack clear criteria for personhood. 6 We do not know in different legal situations who or what the legal person is, nor do we know what kind of being we want her to be. Courts continuously find themselves in situations where they have to define the human being in one way or the other, at times with surprising consequences. 7 This article does not claim that there would be any clear criteria for defining personhood, nor should we even look for them. The argument is much simpler: law always functions on the basis of some presuppositions of what a person is (like). These presuppositions need to be critically analysed.
One permanent difficulty is the tenuous relationship between participation and protection.
This issue is linked to two conflicting ways of understanding the human being: as a rational and free agent on the one hand, and as an insecure and incoherent person on the other. A current and highly relevant question in critical legal research concerns who has the right to take part in law, and in what ways. Through demarcating those who have a legal voice in society, the state (or some other institution with power) exercises inclusion and exclusion. It is important to note that behind the cries for increasing opportunities for participation there often lurks a conception of the human being as a self-conscious rational agent. 8 If we, on the other hand, emphasise protection instead of participation, then the human being we assume as the legal subject looks different. 9 The purposes and tasks that we require a legal system to fulfil depend on our understanding of personhood. Naturally any evaluation of law's success is dependent on it as well. The legitimacy of law is tied to ideas of what it means to be human. For instance according to Fuller, the legal system is flawed if it does not respect people's dignity because law is conceptually founded on the idea of people as responsible agents. 5 On the importance of recognising subjectivity in law see [2] . 6 See especially Ngaire Naffine's interesting work on this topic in [23, 22] . 7 For instance in the famous case R v. 8 For a recent critical analysis of liberalism and agency, see [19] . 9 See e.g. [3, 15] .
It might seem misleading referring to 'the legal person' or 'legal subjectivity' in general, because the legal subject tends to appear in a myriad of forms. In EU law the concept simultaneously refers to an active consumer, a citizen, a political actor and a person in need of protection. However, it is assumed in this article that before we may analyse the diverging forms of legal personhood in more detail, it is helpful to consider some philosophical ideas on the human being. This article takes its inspiration from a historical theory that is not well known nowadays, but sheds light on the complex logics of personhood. Reflecting on the thought of Johann Gottlieb Fichte we can contemplate fundamental aspects of subjectivity, especially in its politico-legal dimensions. By way of such reflection it might also become possible to rethink the category of the legal subject, which the law assumes as one of its constitutive concepts. The practical applications of such rethinking are, however, beyond the scope of this article as they need to be dealt with in more detail than is possible here. The standard account of liberalism presupposes the freedom of a self-conscious (and/or rational) agent, who is at full liberty to choose the kind of life he or she wants to lead, and is therefore responsible for his or her actions and omissions. Every individual is an autonomous agent. What is interesting in Fichte's account is the way his system combines an emphasis on freedom with the idea of a subject who is not autonomous or self-sufficient. Indeed, for
The thoroughly political subject
Fichte, a subject's freedom is conditioned by the existence of another human being.
The self-sufficiency and autonomy of the subject has been discussed recently by Slavoj
Žižek, who discerns foundational foreignness or otherness at the heart of the Cartesian subject [29, p. xxiv] . According to Žižek, we can already find in the work of Kant and the German idealists hints of the idea that the subject is somehow fragmented and not fully known to itself. 10 Putting it crudely for the purposes of the theme at hand, we can locate the Žižekian subject somewhere between the modern and the postmodern. A paradigmatic view of a modern subject would be a conscious and rational agent, who decides to enter into a constitutional agreement in order to form a government, or who negotiates the best possible government behind a veil of ignorance. A postmodern subject would, in contrast, be identified by a fundamental helplessness brought about by the lack of objective truths, clear value systems and credible ideologies. He is no longer opaque to himself, nor conscious of the motives for his actions. We can position Žižek's view in opposition to these two (simplified) depictions.
Žižek's subject is thoroughly political. 11 Political systems create ways of being human, so the subject is never completely her own master. The subject is conditioned by otherness.
However, there is still something in the core of a human being that resists the power structures that constitute it. The idea is that in order for the subject to be able to identify with certain ways of being, that is, become constituted by the political systems, he or she has to already have something or be something. Žižek conceptualises this something as a void or a gap. The fundamental structure of human beings, the structure on which political subjectivity is grounded, is a nothing that nevertheless exists [29, p. 348 [29, p. 418] . In this sense the present-day free subject is not as free as it would seem. The fact that the meaning of an outside lawgiver has diminished does not automatically lead to the subject taking more independent responsibility for his or her actions. This is channelled to the juridical field in interesting ways: Žižek claims that people want a juridical authority (usually a state) to take the role of leader and to free them from the burden and responsibility of free choices [29, p. 440 ]. When we cannot or will not carry our own responsibility we are happy to dispense with it and give the power to the state or other power regimes. Fichte's theory of the human being is interesting because even though he followed Kant and developed an account of the subject where self-determination is firmly attached to freedom, in his version the subject is never his own master. In accordance with the liberal tradition, freedom is the basis on which selfhood rests, but what is interesting in Fichte's system is that he constructs his theory without forgetting the other -on the contrary, the other plays a most important role. A subject's self-consciousness presupposes another person. Fichte's theory can even be compared with the way Emmanuel Levinas conceptualises the relationship between the I and the other. To juxtapose these two theories may seem peculiar. What an odd couple! We can situate them in two groups of theory, of which the first underlines the selfpresence and omnipotence of the subject and the second denies these very features, claiming that there is necessarily otherness at the heart of the human subject. Nevertheless, as we shall see, it is rather difficult to find a place for Fichte in such a classification. His system is one of the first examples of a theory in which the centre of gravity of the subject is put into question.
This makes his philosophy extremely interesting, because it shows the roots of the kind of thinking where the self-knowledge and independence of human beings is challenged.
Fichte's almost autonomous subject
In order to understand the many nuances of Fichte's conception of the human being, an unprejudiced reading of his theory is necessary. Fichte is a system-builder. He sees his own philosophical system as a system of freedom. "My system is the first system of freedom. Just as France has freed man from external shackles, so my system frees him from the fetters of things in themselves …" [11, p. 385] . 13 Fichte measures up to the picture of the philosopher who wants to construct a consistent and comprehensive account of the topics he studies, a totality whose seams fit seamlessly into the fabric. Fichte calls his system Wissenschaftslehre, which can perhaps best be translated as "doctrine of science" or "doctrine of knowledge" [31,
It is a transcendental theory very much influenced by Kant, whose work is not only an interesting attempt to give an account of the basic features of subjectivity, but it also concerns the relationship between the subject and its others. The possessive pronoun is of importance here because, as we shall see, his theory describes the relation between the subject and otherness as always oriented from the subject towards others. The subject is the essential foundation both for himself and his other. 13 Here we see what Fichte's aim is and we can also notice the Kantian context in which he writes. Things in themselves are the main problem of philosophy and developing a way to explain them (away) is Fichte's goal. 14 Fichte starts his discussion with an analysis of rationality. A rational being is defined by the fact that it is an I, a subject, which means that it is self-conscious. This presupposes an activity that has its ground in the rational being itself. Fichte calls it one of the conditions of self-consciousness: there has to be an activity that reverts into itself or has its ground in the rational being itself. In addition, self-consciousness requires that the I or the rational being is limited, determinate and posited by itself in reflection [12, p. 18-21] . These very abstract definitions are the foundation on which Fichte builds his theory in the work. Being the basic assumptions on which the argumentation rests, they form a significant part of the theory and shall therefore be dealt with in some detail here.
Self-consciousness and rationality are connected in a profound way. He says in the introduction of the work that "[t]he rational being is only insofar as it posits itself as being,
i.e. insofar as it is conscious of itself" [12, p. 4] . Thus rationality necessarily presupposes self-consciousness. It seems to follow from this that there cannot be a rational being that is not conscious of itself. In addition, for the self to be self-conscious, there must be something outside the self, a 'not-I'. This term is meant to refer to everything that exists outside of the I,
that is, what is distinguished from the I and opposed to it [11, p. 147] . There have to be objects other than the subject "for we cannot posit ourselves without positing something outside us, to which we must ascribe the same reality we attribute to ourselves" [12, p. 39].
One of Fichte's main presuppositions is that subjectivity necessarily entails intersubjectivity.
The subject cannot be a subject without there being an other. "The human being (like all finite beings in general) becomes a human being only among human beings; and since the human being can be nothing other than a human being and would not exist at all if it were not this -it follows that, if there are to be human beings at all, there must be more than one." [12, p. 37] . According to Fichte, the subject has to posit other rational beings in order for it to be able to posit itself. The argument goes as follows: we are conscious of ourselves as rational beings. In order for this to be possible there has to be something that "awakens" this self-consciousness. This something cannot be an object. It has to be another rational selfconscious subject that makes us aware of ourselves as rational self-conscious subjects. The other being summons the subject to exercise its efficacy (influence, action). We see that in this theory a mirror is needed to show us what we are and in order to work, this mirror has to be of the same kind as we are. The existence of the other is the ultimate ground for the existence of the I. The subject is conditioned by the other.
To be precise, Fichte says that we should not think of the I as a product of the not-I. Rather, what he means to say is that the I can never be conscious of himself unless there is something outside the I and this something is a rational being like himself [11, p. 147 ]. Thus Fichte is strict in the way he defines the subject: its most important feature is its autonomy. But even though he holds on to the idea of an autonomous self he gives the other an important role in awakening the self-consciousness of the self. He says that individuality is something shared.
" [T] he concept of individuality is a reciprocal concept, i.e. a concept that can be thought only in relation to another thought, and one that (with respect to its form) is conditioned by another -indeed by an identical -thought. This concept can exist in a rational being only if it is posited as completed by another rational being. Thus the concept is never mine; rather, it is -in accordance with my own admission and the admission of the other -mine and his, his and mine; it is a shared concept within which two consciousnesses are unified into one." [12, p. 45].
The Fichtean subject in a community
Fichte does not end with the idea that there has to be more than one human subject. The subject is not simply conditioned by the other in an abstract way. The summoning of the other brings with it some content as well. The I and the other stand in a relation. Hence the subject cannot posit other human beings without standing in a particular relation with them.
What is, then the relation between people like? In Foundations of Natural Right Fichte defines this relation as the relation of right. The idea is that the subject is conditioned by the other not only in general but in a rather specific way: the other's existence defines the subject's sphere of activity. This means that the other's existence marks the area where a subject has room to manoeuvre. The subject's independence and freedom are limited by the other but inside his or her own sphere of activity the subject is an absolutely free being [12, p.
39-40]. The result is that every subject's realm of freedom emerges simultaneously as the subject presumes the freedom of another. Everyone is free inside his or her own sphere and each also grants the freedom of the other. The subject and the other therefore summon each other to act freely.
As individuality is simultaneously intersubjectivity, this leads to the idea that a community follows naturally from the nature of the human being. consciousness but a projection that the I makes. Nevertheless, Fichte points out that the other subject resists the I. This structure where the two subjects meet is the foundation for rights.
As the I has to be free in order to be an I at all, when encountering another similar being it realises that this other I has to be free as well. There is freedom against freedom and herein the limits of the subject emerge. The other person's freedom means that the other person has rights and these restrict the ways that I can treat him. This is the reason why Fichte calls the relation between free beings, which he deduces from the concept of the individual, the relation of right. Rights are a necessary feature of being human. He deduces these rights from the nature of man and thus aims to show their universality. 15 As the individual is always necessarily self-conscious, Fichte claims that the concept of right is a condition of selfconsciousness [12, p. 49] . In this way he endeavours to deduce the concept of right from the I. 16 Fichte does underline the ultimate freedom of man but that freedom is always restricted by the freedom sphere of other individuals. To be a subject you need to be aware of yourself. 15 Or, as Herbert puts it, rights are not grounded upon human nature or natural law but should rather be understood as necessary preconditions of self-consciousness. See [16, p. 207 ]. 16 Herbert argues that Fichte's aim was to develop an account of natural rights that finds a firm foundation for them without denying their absolute character. His stance underlines the importance of the human being and his rights in contrast to the good of society. In his theory there is no contradiction between freedom and respect for the rights of other people because freedom exists only through a reciprocal acknowledgement of the freedom of others in a community [16, p. 202-203] .
Nevertheless, the self-consciousness or self-presence of the subject is not pure individuality but includes intersubjectivity. A subject is simultaneously present to itself but not owned by itself. It requires otherness to be what it is. 17 Thus the Fichte's subject is never a pure, autonomous individual. There is otherness already in the transcendental conditions that make man what he is.
Is it still valid to see Fichte's theory as an enemy to freedom as Berlin does? Yes and no.
There is no easy answer because Fichte's thought is ambivalent on this point. In his own view, self-determination is an element of freedom and to some extent the human subject is determined by itself. 18 However, for a person to be a conscious individual, an outside influence is necessary. Here we can sense a contradiction. Fichte claims that the influence on the person cancels his free activity to some degree but at the same time he argues that this influence is attributed by the person to himself. The limitation of his freedom stems from his freedom. He ends up saying that a person's free activity is both cancelled and not cancelled [12, p. 58-59 ]. The idea is that the rational individual is limited, but this limitation is a selflimitation: "there can be no influence on the subject at all, unless the subject, through his own freedom, accepts the impression that has been made upon him and internally imitates it.
[…]
It is precisely such self-limitation that is the exclusive criterion of reason." [12, p. 62 ].
This account clearly includes problems. Fichte also has to explain how people can be free and independent and still live in a community influenced by one another. The question is: how can a person both be independent and dependent on others at the same time? To get out of this tangle we need to think of freedom in a new way and this is what Fichte does. The solution to the contradiction lies at the very heart of his theory of the I: the community is grounded on the self. Fichte says that "the free being, by his mere presence in the sensible world, compels every other free being, without qualification, to recognize him as a person." [12, p. 79] . Freedom presupposes reciprocal interaction between individuals and vice versa.
A person recognises the other person as a free being, not as a thing. From this Fichte deduces the law of right which says us to limit our freedom so that the other alongside us can also be free. The law is necessary in a community of free beings and, according to Fichte, whoever wills such a community must necessarily will this law. However, Fichte underlines that this 17 See Jean-Luc Nancy's interesting discussion of self-presence in [24, p. 8 ]. Nancy does not see the fact that the subject is present but not present to himself as a contradiction. He says that "I can find no other name for this than the name of 'freedom'. Not freedom as the property of the subject ('the subject is free'), but freedom as the very experience of coming into presence law is willed and chosen freely. In order for the law to apply, everybody must make it a law for himself [12, p. 82-84] . 19 Here we see that even though a person can be self-conscious only through recognition of the other person, both are free agents with a choice to respect the other's freedom or not. There is nothing that compels a person to behave in such a way as not to interfere with or even annihilate altogether the freedom of others.
There is another problem with Fichte's theory that has to be considered before we can get a that it is logically impossible to violate rights. However, if we interpret Fichte in a way that allows the foundation of rights to be of a normative character this contradiction can be eased.
Mutual recognition that leads to respect for the other's freedom and rights would thus be a normative demand that Fichte places on us. In this way, violation of rights and lack of mutual recognition would result in the same thing: an offence against the way we are supposed to behave. Through such a reading the separation between the is (transcendental conditions for personhood) and the ought (our responsibility to respect the rights of others) become blurred.
This does not necessarily make Fichte's theory a failure; rather, such a creative reading makes him more postmodern than modern. To sum up the most important points so far we should especially notice two things. Firstly, Fichte, even though a German idealist, is certainly a philosopher whose obsession with the absolute and foundational freedom of the human being makes him easily identified with the liberal(ist) tradition. Still, his system includes elements that are incompatible with some liberalist views. Secondly, his theory of the person does not make the human being completely self-centred, for one human being is necessarily conditioned by another. We see 20 See also [1, p. 38-39] . Balibar points out the noteworthy fact that the moment when Kant produces the transcendental subject is the same historical moment when the subject understood as a person submitted to monarchical power is replaced with the republican citizen defined by his rights and duties. We can see a similar logic in Fichte's thought: from the perspective of communities, persons are primarily understood as citizens.
also that in his theory rights are natural and respect for the rights of the other person is necessary in a community. Nevertheless, he does see these rights as tied to the state to such an extent that an individual as such is only a bearer of the minimal right to acquire rights.
Where is ethics?
Is the Fichtean self-positing activity of the I connected with a moral obligation towards the other? According to Daniel Brezeale, it entails a practical self-awareness that is both concrete and particular. It is not an awareness of a general moral principle but includes a concrete duty in a concrete situation. This duty pertains only to me as an individual I [6, p. 191 ]. If we read
Fichte in this way we can think of him deriving an absolute moral obligation from his theory of the subject. The human subject becomes himself, a particular individual, through realising his moral obligation towards the other. We can find elements in Žižek's reading of Fichte that would confirm some ethical significance in the very structure of Fichtean subjectivity.
According to Žižek, "The Anstoss, the primordial impulse that sets in motion the gradual selflimitation and self-determination of the initially void subject, is not merely a mechanical external impulse: it also points towards another subject who, in the abyss of its freedom, functions as the challenge (Aufforderung) compelling me to limit/specify my freedom, that is, to accomplish the passage from the abstract egotistic freedom to concrete freedom within the rational ethical universe." [30, p. 150 ].
This way of interpreting Fichte is tempting, but even if we endorsed it, we would still find his system lacking in ethical content. For him, the subject is primary and ethics secondary. His aim is to define the transcendental conditions for the rational human being. In Levinasian ethics, for instance, the I exists in a world surrounded by things that are alien to it and different from it. At a very primary level, the subject has experiences which lead it to distinguish between itself and other things. The subject learns to live with these things that are alien to it, to play with them, to control them, to use them. It can enjoy the things at its pleasure. Thus far the subject looks remarkably Fichtean. According to Levinas, we have a strong inclination to treat other things as either extensions of ourselves or as alien objects that can be manipulated. We find in ourselves a primordial egocentrism. However, Levinas's important idea is that this picture is not applicable to the way we experience other persons. Fichte's account of the subject is constructed as an integral part of his epistemology. He is looking for a foundation for knowledge. In addition, Fichte is an egophilosopher, but not a full-blooded one. His understanding of intersubjectivity entails a push that nudges the subject slightly off focus. The self is not completely self-centred but always interrupted by otherness.
He explains this in
This goes for Levinas as well. His view entails that the subject is always de-centred and torn by the absolute and impossible demand that stems from the other. As also Žižek points out, the Levinasian subject is never autonomous but split by the ethical call. This can be seen as a paradox in the sense that the demand that the subject can never meet is what makes the subject [30, p. 829] . A structurally similar logic is at play in Fichte's thinking.
There is a highly important difference between the two thinkers, though. Fichte takes it for granted that the other is the subject's other, that is, the other is always secondary. The subject comes first, which entails exactly the kind of egocentric attitude that Levinas tries to get away from. In Levinasian terms we could claim that in Fichte's theory everything returns and is reduced to the same, even otherness. However, also for Fichte there can be no subject without the other. In order to become a subject at all the subject has to posit the other. inside the sphere of the unity of the ego, is egoistic and unethical.
Conclusions: autonomy and the legal subject
What relevance can Fichte's thinking have for legal theory today? It was set out in the beginning of this article that our conception of the legal personhood and subjectivity necessarily rests on some philosophical underpinnings. One of them is the idea of autonomy.
There are obvious difficulties with understanding human beings as autonomous. After Kant the picture of a self-satisfied subject started to crumble and Fichte may be the first philosopher who develops the idea of a subject whose autonomy is preceded by heteronomy, as MacCormick would put it. We have seen that in Fichte's theory, as in the work of Schelling after him, the subject becomes conditioned by otherness [14, p. 6-7] . In Fichte this idea is only in its infancy, as he still holds on to the free and self-conscious subject. For him the subject is an active and self-directing agent. Nevertheless, this subject cannot do without the other person, because rational self-conscious personhood is dependent on an encounter with another rational human being. Fichte provides a tentative answer to our guiding question. He shows how a subject can be autonomous though permeated by otherness.
The idea of a free self-centred subject is the one that underlies legal thinking and to some extent it probably has to be so. We often understand the legal in accordance with the liberal tradition as a free rational agent who makes choices and is therefore able to carry responsibility for his actions. This view may include an unrealistic picture of the human condition in practice because we are not all equally fit or equally lucky to live our lives exactly as we want. Still, it is very difficult to conceive the legal subject radically otherwise.
A Levinasian subject, for whom the other always comes first, is alien for modern legal thought.
In law, every human being, even a child or a disabled one, is at least potentially an autonomous agent. The self-present responsible subject is the same one who has made social contracts through the history of political philosophy and is thus in essence the citizen, that is, the creature who has rights and duties because of his participation in the community. This view may be idealistic, because there are beings that tend to drop out, such as illegal immigrants, who become non-subjects. Animals are of course another problematic group.
Nevertheless, the legal subject understood as an autonomous subject is what jurisprudence is stuck with. But Fichte's theory explains how autonomy is not the same as self-sufficiency, nor does it entail complete self-mastery.
We can thus conclude that even though the legal subject has to be autonomous to some degree, acknowledging otherness inside the self, which both Fichte and Levinas do in their own ways, can be an alternative way of founding the legal subject. This idea has its benefits because it does not force us into a position, according to which everybody is presupposed to hold the keys to his happiness firmly in his own hands. If we take seriously the Fichtean idea that the other is necessary for the existence of an I, this can have effects for our conception of responsibility and rights. We can never encounter the other person simply as foreign because he or she is important to us in intricate ways. He or she is a fellow human being sharing existence with us and making us what we are.
Judith Butler argues that it is precisely our opacity to ourselves that makes it possible for us to confer a certain kind of recognition on others. If nothing else, the realization that one is not completely the master of oneself and that there is something for which one cannot give account might at least induce patience towards others. One would not expect other people to be rational and self-conscious at every moment either. The idea is that when we understand that we can never know ourselves completely, we realize that we cannot expect anything else from others. Butler turns upside down the idea that a subject who is opaque to herself is therefore not fully responsible for her actions. The fact that we are always interrupted by alterity means that we are ethically implicated in the lives of others [7, p. 37, 8, p. 83-92 ].
There are ethico-political implications in seeing human beings as fundamentally void, lacking and unknown to themselves. This understanding of personhood can be a conceptual foundation for legal subjectivity that acknowledges autonomy preceded by heteronomy.
